Power From the Barrel of a Gun: The Codes of the New Cold War

Winston Churchill is said to have remarked, in the hottest days of the Second World War, that “there is only one thing worse than fighting w...

Winston Churchill is said to have remarked, in the hottest days of the Second World War, that “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.”

Looking at the world today, we can see this line gaining new meaning in the shadow of the U.S.–China rivalry.

As U.S.–Chinese competition diversifies and spreads across different fronts, we are witnessing the “new Cold War” taking on an increasingly distinct character.

From Washington’s perspective, containing China is not merely a question of military deterrence. It also requires a broad-based alliance. A similar logic applies to Beijing as well. From the Belt and Road Initiative to BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China is preoccupied with constructing an alternative chain of partners.

Although China officially claims to oppose “alliance politics” the emerging international mechanisms and its “no-limits partnership” with Moscow, which in practice amounts to an undeclared alliance, are part of this picture.

However, merely building alliances or gaining new partners is not enough to win this contest.

China’s recent lavish military parade and the military capabilities displayed there also stand out as defining factors.

The lines are now clearly drawn.

On one side is a “multipolarity axis” consisting of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. On the other side stands NATO, led by the United States, which is steadily increasing its defense spending.

According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2024, the total military expenditure of NATO member states stood at around $1.5 trillion.

Some 66 percent of this came from the United States alone, with military spending of $997 billion.

In 2024, China spent roughly $314 billion on defense, while Russia’s defense expenditure reached about $149 billion.

North Korea’s figures are unknown, although they are assumed to be relatively low.

According to SIPRI, Iran’s military spending in 2024 was approximately $7.9 billion.

Taken together, the annual defense spending of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran is roughly in the $480–490 billion range.

In other words, the United States alone spends nearly twice as much as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea combined, highlighting the economic foundations of the imbalance between the blocs.

Troop numbers in the bloc led by China and Russia are substantial.

On paper, their active personnel outnumber those of NATO.

The 32 current NATO member states field approximately 3.37 million active-duty troops.

China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran together have approximately 5 million active soldiers.

However, larger troop numbers no longer automatically translate into greater military capability. Contemporary warfare is increasingly understood as a clash between technologies and ecosystems.

Technology has become the indispensable core of today’s wars. Through its military–civil fusion strategy and its approach to “intelligentized warfare” China is attempting to integrate systems that simulate future wars.

The unmanned submarines and laser-guided air defense systems unveiled at its latest military parade are hallmarks of this approach to military development.

Turning to nuclear balance, Russia and the United States compete head-to-head in terms of warhead numbers, while China is clearly on an upward trajectory.

NATO holds a significant advantage in the air. However, China and Russia are trying to close the gap with platforms such as the J-20 and Su-57. China’s testing of sixth-generation fighter aircraft could prove genuinely game-changing.

NATO member states collectively field more than 22,000 military aircraft for various mission types.

While NATO enjoys numerical superiority in the skies, China’s sixth-generation projects and Russia’s new-generation platforms have the potential to rewrite the rules of the game.

At sea, the NATO bloc remains dominant.

The U.S. Navy, with its 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, remains the most powerful fleet of the post–World War II era.

In terms of sheer hull numbers, China’s navy has overtaken that of the United States, but it still lags in aircraft carriers.

Over the last decade, the Chinese navy has put two aircraft carriers (Liaoning and Shandong) into service and begun sea trials for a third, larger carrier (Fujian). In fact, it officially entered service recently.

For example, the 68 nuclear-powered submarines operated by the United States constitute a critical pillar of deterrence on the NATO side.

Simultaneously, China’s coastal defense systems are highly advanced.

Even as China increases its fleet and shows the flag at sea, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines remain core pillars of blue-water deterrence. In this equation, the United States and NATO still appear to be ahead of the others.

In the field of artificial intelligence, the United States and its allies control the backbone of the semiconductor and software industries.

China is trying to match this tempo on a similar scale, but it is struggling with sanctions and export controls in areas such as access to advanced chips.

On the other hand, NATO represents a 75-year-old standard military alliance.

Decades of exercises, planning, and command-and-control practices have endowed it with visible deterrent credibility.

By contrast, the China–Russia axis remains, for now, largely confined to declaratory “no-limits partnership” rhetoric.

Despite enthusiastic displays of proximity on the ground, coordination failures and ecosystem constraints are acute.

North Korea, meanwhile, is the “noise amplifier” in this picture. Yet at the regional level, it can become a highly useful geopolitical instrument that broadens China’s room for maneuver.

The real question here is how to sustain military effort over time and keep pace with a technology-intensive tempo.

NATO economies spin the innovation–industry cycle quickly and diversify their supply chains.

Russia operates within a sanctions corridor; China faces friction in areas such as access to advanced chips.

In short, in this marathon it is those with staying power who will ultimately prevail.

At the strategic level, NATO’s money–technology–alliance triangle offers a promise of continuity.

The China–Russia–North Korea axis is trying to build a balance by building layers of defense in its near abroad. At the same time, there is a continuing effort—gradual and flexible, but real—to develop and deepen their partnership.

Iran, for its part, maintains a stance somewhat detached from this core axis, while seeking support within institutions such as BRICS and the SCO.

In sum, the United States is drawing its allies together into a tight network architecture as it prepares for the hotter “phases” of the struggle for global hegemony.

China, meanwhile, in a way that recalls Mao Zedong’s famous dictum that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” is rebuilding the military deterrent it long neglected—on a technology-intensive foundation and within a “people’s war” concept rooted in military–civil fusion.

The future of the global struggle for hegemony—and of this new Cold War—will largely be determined by economic resilience and technological innovation.