Abandoned Sovereignty and the Multipolar Global Order

Power does not tolerate a vacuum.

International relations theory accepts that the global order is shaped by systemic anarchy. Moments of consensus may appear, but history has largely been driven by rivalry, conflict, and war.

Power vacuums emerging during periods of reduced great-power competition expose entire regions to instability. During the Cold War, such vacuums were contained by intense superpower rivalry.

After the Soviet collapse, however, the world entered a period of unquestioned U.S. dominance—and the early signs of new vacuums passed largely unnoticed in Washington.

Still, dissenting voices existed. While many interpreted the fall of the USSR as ushering in a “multipolar global order,” Charles Krauthammer famously announced a unipolar moment, arguing in 1991 that the United States stood as the world’s unchallenged center of power.

Conversely, Paul Kennedy, viewed Asia—particularly Japan—as the principal beneficiary of the new era.

Francis Fukuyama offered the most influential reading of the period. In his 1989 article “The End of History?” he suggested that the liberal order represented not only the end of the Cold War but possibly “the end of history itself.” His thesis became a powerful ideological justification for American supremacy throughout the 1990s.

During this time, the United States projected unmatched soft power and built a form of cultural hegemony. The unipolar moment looked like an impregnable fortress, yet it also concealed growing vulnerabilities. Fukuyama later conceded—belatedly—in his Political Order series that modern states are fragile and prone to institutional decay.

The post–Cold War era soon saw a surge in conflict. The mutual-deterrence logic that had constrained the superpowers evaporated with the USSR’s collapse. A significant power vacuum emerged—one China moved quickly to fill.

Today, the European Union, India, Russia, and various regional actors seek to assert their own influence. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, and the deepening U.S.–China rivalry all reflect this shifting landscape.

While the U.S.–China contest suggests elements of a “new bipolarity,” a broader multipolarity is clearly taking shape. Abandoned sovereignty—areas of power left unclaimed, unmanaged, or ignored—is becoming a central fault line in global competition.

China and Russia are moving from a comprehensive strategic partnership toward a de facto alliance while advancing a multipolar order they argue will restore stability. At its core lies a promise: a fairer distribution of power and a more legitimate global system.

This vision—expressed through BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and other emerging platforms—seeks to integrate the Global South more deeply into global governance and to create its own legitimacy.

The United States, meanwhile, is trying to reinvigorate its alliances and craft a coherent counterstrategy. Yet Washington often appears reactive, lacking a clear blueprint for reforming an international order in crisis.

China and Russia insist that multipolarity is the cure for global disorder.

Here, Sun Tzu’s reminder still resonates:

“Victorious warriors win first and then go to war; defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.”

A strategy without tactics remains the longest road to victory.